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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16827

LAWRENCE J. SORENSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEME:NT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

-

Appellant appeals from a jury verdict
of guilty on four counts of Theft and/or Theft
by Deception in violation of Utah Code Ann.
and/or

§

76-6-405

§

76-6-404

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by

a jury

before the

Honorable Dean E. Conder and was convicted of four counts
of Theft or Theft.by Deception.

Appellant was sentenced

for the indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years.

The execution of this sentence

was stayed and appellant was placed on probation.

The
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conditions of probation included a period of incarceration
in the Salt Lake County Jail of six months (R. at 153-154).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to affirm the conviction in
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant formed Western Heritage, Inc., in late
1977 for the purpose of assisting clients in establishing
retail franchising operations (R. at 290).

Appellant served

as the corporation's Chairman of the Board and Manager-Director

0

On April 4, 1978, David Candland and Lester Thatcher
(victims) contacted Western Heritage seeking property financing, and professional assistance for a restaurant to be
named "Apple Dumplin'" which was to be established in Utah.
During the first meeting with the appellant, appellant made
the following representations to Candland and Thatcher:
1. Western would sell property
located at 941 South State to used
for the restaurant;
2. Western could procure
one hundred percent (100%) leaseback
financing;
3. Western was a large, successful,
real estate development firm with
offices around the United States;
4.
Western had been involved in numerous
other successful projects similar to that
proposed by Candland and Thatcher;
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11.

5. Western had a commitment for
$10,000,000.00 from an outsi.de
financing source; and
6. Western was staffed by members
of the L.D.S. Church in good standing.
(R. 97,98,99,195,199,200).
Relying on these representations, Candland and Thatcher
agreed to deal with appellant and Western Heritage in
establishing the "Apple Dumplin'" restaurant.
The following is a synopsis, in chronological
order, of the events which gave rise to the four counts
of Theft.

On April 28, 1978, appellant requested and

received $5,000.00 from Candland and Thatcher.

That same

day, the complainants entered into an Earnest Money Agreement
with Western Heritage on the property located· at 941 South
State, Salt Lake City.

The $5,000.00 payment was induced

by these representations from appellant:
1.
The money was needed for financing
and would not be applied to the deposit
required by the Earnest Money Agreement;
2.

The payment was a refundable deposit;

3.
Funding was available if they could
qualify for such;
4. All_ "up front" monies would be returned when financing was approved; and
5.
The money received by Western would
be held in a special trust or real estate
escrow account. (R. at 99-101).
Contrary to these representations financing was never
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obtained, the money was not returned and the $5,000.00
was not placed in a special trust or escrow account.

The

money was spent in Western's regular course of business.
On May l, 1978, Thatcher paid appellant an
additional $5,000.00 which appellant represented as necessary .
to obtain financing.
the same

Thatcher made payment in reliance on

repr~sentations

as noted above.

This money was also

deposited in the business account and spent in the regular
course of business.

The money never remained in a escrow

account as promised by appellant.
On the 17th day of June, 1978, Thatcher paid an
additional $10,000.00 in reliance on the following representations made by appellant:
1. Candland and Thatcher's financial
statement was insufficient to obtain
financing (R. at 189);
2. Appellant had substantial capital
and was willing to invest with Candland
and Thatcher and become their partner;
3. The first and last months payment
of $20,000.00 had to be paid immediately
to facilitate approval of the financing;
4. Appellant would invest $10,000.00
if Candland and Thatcher could come up with an
additional $10,000.00;
5.

Financing had been approved; and

6.
The $10,000.00 would be .returned once
the funding was actually obtained (R. at 191-193).
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The money paid to Western Heritage was deposited in
Western's business account and spent in the regular course
of business.
In August of 1978, Thatcher paid $22,000.00 to
Western Heritage.

The payment was induced by these

representations:
1. The funding previously approved
had fallen through;
2. Additional up front money was
needed to secure new funding;
3.
Appellant would put up $50,000.00
of his own funds to obtain the f inancing; and
4.
The money would only be needed for
a couple of days (R. at 193).
Of the $22,000.00 mentioned above, $14,000.00 was paid out
to get the financing.

Some of the $14,000.00 was returned

and placed in the business account along with the remaining
$8,000.00.

This money was spent in the regular course of

business.by appellant.
At trial the appellant attempted to repeat statements allegedly made by a financier to prove that financing
was indeed
303).

availa~le

to Western Heritage (R. at 240,241,302,

These statements were excluded as hearsay by the court.

The court ruled that the statements were being offered for the
truth of the matter asserted.

-5-
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At the close of the evidence, appellant requested
that the jury receive an instruction on the elements of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-17

(1953), which reads as follows:

77-31-17.
False pretenses-Evidence
of .~Upon a trial for having· obtained,
with an intent to cheat or defraud another designedly by any false pretense,
the signature of any person to a written
instrument, or from any person any money,
personal property or valuable thing, the
def~ndant shall not be convict~d; if the
false pretense was expressed in language,
unaccompanied by a false token or writing,
unless the pretense or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing, subscribed
by or in the handwriting of the defendant,
or unless the pre~ense is proved by the
testimony of two witnesses, or that of one
witness and corroborating circumstances;
but this section shall not apply to a
prosecution for falsely representing or
personating another, and in such assumed
character marrying, or receiving any money
or property.
The Court refused to give an instruction covering that
Statute, but did instruct the jury on the elements of
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-404 and

§

76-6-405 (1953) as

amended.
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ARGU!-IBNT
POINT I
THE REFUSAL TO SUBMIT AN INSTRUCTION
ON UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-17 (1953),
AS AMENDED, WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-31-17
(1953), AS AMENDED, HAS BEEN
REPEALED BY IMPLICATION.
In 1973, the Utah Legislature expressly repealed
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), as amended, which defined
the crime of "False Pretense" in the Criminal Code.

See

Ballaine v. District Court, 107 Utah 247, 255, 153 P.2d
265, 267

(1944).

The legislature, however, failed to expressly

repeal from the Code of Criminal Procedure Utah Code Ann. §
77-31-17

(1953), as amended, concerning the evidence required

in a false pretense case.
Respondent submits that the statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-31-17, was repealed by implication with the repeal
of Section 76-20-8 and simultaneous adoption of Utah Code
Ann. § 7 6- 6- 4 0 3 ( 19 7 3) .
Section 76-6-403 (1973), defines "Theft" as those
offenses "heretofore known as la'rceny, larceny by trick,
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion

"

(Emphasis added.)
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It is clear that the offense of Theft now includes False
Pretense.

The separate offense of False Pretense no longer

exists; that offense is now known as Theft.

It logically

follows that Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-17 is of no force
and effect.

Since the offense of false pretense, as a

separate, unique cause of action does not exist, application of the eyidence requirements of Utah Code Ann. §
77-31-17 never arises.
Appellant does not dispute that False Pretense
and the new inclusive crime of Theft proscribe the same
conduct (Appellant's Brief at 8 and 9).
therefore, cover the same subject.

The statutes,

Under Utah law

subsequently enacted statutes generally supersede prior
existing statutes when they relate to the same subject.
Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (Utah 1977).
Later enactments also take precedence over prior
enactments where the two are plainly inconsistent. Thiokol
Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391
(1964).
conflict.

In this case, Sections 77-31-17 and 76-6-403 do
They differ as to the evidence that can be

used to prove Theft.

Unlike Section 77-31-17, Section

76-6-403 does not require a writing or two witnesses or one
witness with corroborating circumstances.

Instead, Section

76-6-403 states, in part:
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An accusation of theft may be
supported by evidence that it was
corrunitted in any manner specified in
sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410,

Not one of the sections referred to (Sections 76-6-404
through 76-6-410) require the same evidence as does
Section 77-31-17.

In this case, theft was shown at

trial by the manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 and
76-6-405.

Because of the conflict between the more

recent enactments and Section 77-31-17, this procedure
was proper and Section 76-6-403 (1973) controls.
B

THE STATE SATISFIED THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-31-17 (1953), AS
AMENDED.
Even if the statute was not repealed by
implication, the prosecution nonetheless met the
evidentiary requirements of Section 77-31-17.

Those

requirements are that the false pretense be shown by:
1.

A writing (note or memorandum)

subscribed

by or in the handwriting of the defendant, or

2.

Testimony of two witnesses, or

3.

Testimony of one witness and corroborating

circumstances.
It should be noted, contrary to appellant's
belief, these requirements are disjunctive and, therefore,
corroboration is not essential (Appellant's Brief at 12).
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The transcript of this case indicates that documents
were admitted as evidence of appellant's false representations.

One example is appellant's promise to keep the money

received by Western in an escrow account rather than a
general business account (State's Exhibit No. 13).

The

transcript clearly shows that more than two witnesses
testified for the State (R.160,161).

Under Section

77-31-17 the testimony of Candland and Thatcher was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements.

The failure to give

a requested instruction concerning alternative theories
is not error where the instruction was cumulative and amply
covered by other instructions given.
21 Utah 2d 187, 442

P.~d

State v. Martinez,

943, 944 (1968).

c
FAILURE TO SUBMIT APPELLANT'S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NAS HARMLESS
ERROR.
Should this Court find that the refusal to
instruction on Section 77-31-17 was error, such refusal
did not prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant
and, thus, does not justify reversal of the conviction.
This Court has on numerous occasions pointed out
that it "will not reverse criminal cases for mere error
or irregularity."
756 (1953).

State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d

Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), as amended,

provides:
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After hearing an appeal the court
must give judgment without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
If
error has been committed, it shall not be
presumed to have resulted in prejudice.
The court must be satisfied that it
has that effect before it is warranted
in reversing the judgment.
Refusal to give an instruction cannot be the basis for
reversal if the jury is sufficiently advised of the
issue they are to determine, or it appears that they
were not confused or misled to the prejudice of the
defendant.

State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491

P. 2d 1093 I 1095 (1971).
As noted above, the requirements of Section
77-31717 were established by the State at trial.
Appellant does not contest that fact.

Determination of

whether a writing had been submitted or whether the testimony
of two witnesses had been heard can be made by examination
of the transcript.

These determinations, therefore, did

not require special consideration by a jury.

Therefore,

failure to instruct the jury did not prejudice the appellant
and cannot be the basis for a reversal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDgD APPELLANT'S
PROFFERED STATEMENTS SINCE THE STATEMENTS WERE
HEARSAY AND OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER
ASSERTED.
Hearsay is defined by Rule 63 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence as:
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Evidence of a statement which is
made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered
to prove the matter asserted.
As a defense to the theft charges, appellant
attempted to prove that he made an honest effort to
obtain financing for the restaurant of Candland and
Thatcher.

The appellant chose to establish this point

by referring to statements made to him by Mr. King and
other financiers, the alleged source of funding for the
project.

The statements made by King would have proved

the actual existence of financing, but Mr. King was
never called by the appellant.

Respondent submits that

if appellant wished to establish what Mr. King said
with_regard to financing, then the only alternative
was to call Mr. King as a witness.
Appellant made no effort to establish that
Mr. King was unavailable for trial nor did appellant

establish that any effort had been made to locate Mr. King.
Appellant suggests that the evidence introduced
by respondent was based on a theory of deception.

The

information filed was issued with alternative pleadings
involving Theft or Theft by Deception.
was:

Respondent's theory

fl) appellant exercised ''unauthorized control" over

the property of Candland and Thatcher when he used the
money for regular business.
to hold the money in escrow.

Appellant was authorized
He was not authorized to take
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the money from escrow or use the funds for Western Heritage;
(2) appellant deceived Candland and Thatcher when he
advised them that the money was in escrow, that financing
had been obtained, and that he would match funds with
the investment of Candland and Thatcher.
The jury was instructed on both charges.

The

verdict does not indicate which theory the jury relied
on to convict appellant.

Appellant's statement that he

was convicted for acts of deception is not totally correct.
A conviction for theft would not require evidence of
deception.

Therefore, the statements by a third party

(Mr. King and other financiers) would be immaterial to a
conviction.
Appellant and

v. o.

Adams testified that Western

Heritage attempted to obtain financing from several sources.
Both witnesses testified that they relied on the representations made by those sources.
Appellant was attempting to prove that an honest
effort was made on his behalf to obtain financing for the
victims.

Appellant was able to do that without introducing

the statements of an out-of-court witness.

The statements

of the.financier were not material to the issue and therefore
were properly excluded by the trial court.
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The statements of Mr. King and other financiers
do not fit into the recognized exception regarding "state
of mind."

In order to satisfy the "state of mind" exception

under Rule 63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence, the statements
must be offered to show the declarant's (King's)
of mind.

state

r

'

'

Appellant claims that he offered the statements

of Mr. King to show appellant's state of mind.

The court

ruled that such evidence was not admissible because it was
not offered to show Mr. King's state of mind.
Appellant cites Frank v. United States, 220 F.2d
559 (10th Cir. 1955), as controlling on the question of
whether King's statements were admissible.

In Frank, the

court said that statements of a third party were admissible
to prove that the defendant relief on such statements and
representations because the statements were not offered
to show the truth (or falsity) of the charges in the
complaints.

In this case, appellant was not attempting

to prove that he relied on the statements of a third party
(Mr. King).

The appellant was attempting to show that he

made an effort to obtain financing from various sources.
In Hoffmann v. United States, 353 F.2d 188, 190
(10th Cir. 1965), the court cited Frank for the proposition
that good faith is material to the defense in a fraud case.

'
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However, the court also stated that hearsay could not be
used to show good faith; good faith must be shown by "proper.
evidence,"

The appellant was able to show that he made a

good faith effort to obtain financing without relating the
conversations of Mr. King.
to the sources he or Valoy

Appellant testified as

o.

Adams contacted and what

efforts he made to obtain such financing.

Therefore, the

statements of Mr. King were not material to the case.
Hearsay has historically been categorized as
inadmissible evidence because it is unreliable.

The jury

is not allowed to judge the credibility of the declarant
and there is always the chance that the witness will
fabricate or exaggerate the alleged atatements of a third
person.

Exceptions to the hearsay rule were carved out

due to the trustworthy character of certain hearsay evidence.
But when the evidence, such as the proffered statements in
this case, is not shown to have a trustworthy or reliable
quality, due to its self-serving nature, then the policy
against admitting unreliable evidence is met by excluding
those statements.

The trial court properly excluded

the statements after determining that the statements were
hearsay and offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
If this Court finds that it was error to exclude
the testimony of Mr. King or other financiers, respondent
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submits that it was harmless error.

Proof of deception

as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2) did not turn on
the admission or exclusion of King's statements.

Deception

was shown at trial by the testimony of witnesses and by
the introduction of documents signed by appellant.
Failure to allow admission of appellant's proffered
evidence did not prejudice his substantive rights and was
therefore, harmless error, if error at all.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct the jury on Utah Code Ann.

77-31-17 (1953),

§

as it has been repealed and ·superseded by Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-403 through 76-6-410 (1973).

The later enactments,

effective in 1973, take precedence over Section 77-31-17.
The evidence proffered by appellant at trial
was properly excluded as hearsay since King's statements
were offered to show the truth of the matter asserted:
that financing was available.

If this Court finds,

however, that the lower court did err,

respondent submits

that only harmless error was committed.
Respondent prays for this Court to aff i~m
appellant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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